Q. 1 Critically evaluate the politics impact of Cold War-I & II and Post-Cold War Era 1990-2021, on world at large.
During World War II, the United States and the Soviet
Union fought together as allies against the Axis powers. However, the
relationship between the two nations was a tense one. Americans had long been
wary of Soviet communism and concerned about Russian leader Joseph Stalin’s
tyrannical rule of his own country. For their part, the Soviets resented the
Americans’ decades-long refusal to treat the USSR as a legitimate part of the
international community as well as their delayed entry into World War II, which
resulted in the deaths of tens of millions of Russians. After the war ended,
these grievances ripened into an overwhelming sense of mutual distrust and
enmity.
Postwar Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe fueled
many Americans’ fears of a Russian plan to control the world. Meanwhile, the
USSR came to resent what they perceived as American officials’ bellicose
rhetoric, arms buildup and interventionist approach to international relations.
In such a hostile atmosphere, no single party was entirely to blame for the
Cold War; in fact, some historians believe it was inevitable.
The Cold War: Containment
By the time World War II ended, most American
officials agreed that the best defense against the Soviet threat was a strategy
called “containment.” In his famous “Long Telegram,” the diplomat George Kennan
(1904-2005) explained the policy: The Soviet Union, he wrote, was “a political
force committed fanatically to the belief that with the U.S. there can be no
permanent modus vivendi [agreement between parties that disagree].” As a
result, America’s only choice was the “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant
containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” “It must be the policy of the
United States,” he declared before Congress in 1947, “to support free peoples
who are resisting attempted subjugation…by outside pressures.” This way of
thinking would shape American foreign policy for the next four decades.
Did you know? The term 'cold war' first appeared in a
1945 essay by the English writer George Orwell called 'You and the Atomic
Bomb.'
The Cold War: The Atomic Age
The containment strategy also provided the rationale
for an unprecedented arms buildup in the United States. In 1950, a National
Security Council Report known as NSC–68 had echoed Truman’s recommendation that
the country use military force to contain communist expansionism anywhere it
seemed to be occurring. To that end, the report called for a four-fold increase
in defense spending.
In particular, American officials encouraged the
development of atomic weapons like the ones that had ended World War II. Thus
began a deadly “arms race.” In 1949, the Soviets tested an atom bomb of their
own. In response, President Truman announced that the United States would build
an even more destructive atomic weapon: the hydrogen bomb, or “superbomb.”
Stalin followed suit.
As a result, the stakes of the Cold War were
perilously high. The first H-bomb test, in the Eniwetok atoll in the Marshall
Islands, showed just how fearsome the nuclear age could be. It created a
25-square-mile fireball that vaporized an island, blew a huge hole in the ocean
floor and had the power to destroy half of Manhattan. Subsequent American and
Soviet tests spewed radioactive waste into the atmosphere.
The ever-present threat of nuclear annihilation had a
great impact on American domestic life as well. People built bomb shelters in
their backyards. They practiced attack drills in schools and other public
places. The 1950s and 1960s saw an epidemic of popular films that horrified
moviegoers with depictions of nuclear devastation and mutant creatures. In
these and other ways, the Cold War was a constant presence in Americans’
everyday lives.
The Cold War and the Space Race
Space exploration served as another dramatic arena for
Cold War competition. On October 4, 1957, a Soviet R-7 intercontinental
ballistic missile launched Sputnik (Russian for “traveling companion”), the
world’s first artificial satellite and the first man-made object to be placed
into the Earth’s orbit. Sputnik’s launch came as a surprise, and not a pleasant
one, to most Americans. In the United States, space was seen as the next
frontier, a logical extension of the grand American tradition of exploration,
and it was crucial not to lose too much ground to the Soviets. In addition,
this demonstration of the overwhelming power of the R-7 missile–seemingly
capable of delivering a nuclear warhead into U.S. air space–made gathering
intelligence about Soviet military activities particularly urgent.
In 1958, the U.S. launched its own satellite, Explorer
I, designed by the U.S. Army under the direction of rocket scientist Wernher
von Braun, and what came to be known as the Space Race was underway. That same
year, President Dwight Eisenhower signed a public order creating the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), a federal agency dedicated to
space exploration, as well as several programs seeking to exploit the military
potential of space. Still, the Soviets were one step ahead, launching the first
man into space in April 1961.
That May, after Alan Shepard become the first American
man in space, President John F. Kennedy (1917-1963) made the bold public claim
that the U.S. would land a man on the moon by the end of the decade. His
prediction came true on July 20, 1969, when Neil Armstrong of NASA’s Apollo 11
mission, became the first man to set foot on the moon, effectively winning the
Space Race for the Americans.
Post–Cold War era
The post–Cold War era is a period of history that
follows the end of the Cold War, which represents history after the 1991 fall
of the Soviet Union. During most of the latter half of the 20th century, the
two most powerful states in the world were the Soviet Union and the United
States. Both federations were called the world's superpowers.
Faced with the threat of growing German and Italian
fascism, Japanese Shōwa statism, and a world war, the Western Allies and the
Soviet Union made an alliance of necessity during World War II. The pragmatic
nature of that alliance and the underlying ideological differences between the
powers led to mutual suspicions between the allies after the Axis powers were
defeated.
The struggle, known as the Cold War, lasted from about
1947 to 1991. It began with the second Red Scare and ended with the fall of the
Soviet Union. A prominent historian of the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis, wrote
at the dawn of the post–Cold War era that the characteristics of the new era
are not yet certain but that it was certain that it would be very different
from the Cold War era and that it meant that a turning point of world-historical
significance took place.
The new world of the post–Cold War era is likely to
have few, if any, of these [Cold War] characteristics: that is an indication of
how much things have already changed since the Cold War ended. We are at one of
those rare points of 'punctuation' in history at which old patterns of stability
have broken up and new ones have not yet emerged to take their place.
Historians will certainly regard the years 1989–1991 as a turning point
comparable in importance to the years 1789–1794, or 1917–1918, or 1945–1947;
precisely what has 'turned,' however, is much less certain. We know that a
series of geopolitical earthquakes have taken place, but it is not yet clear
how these upheavals have rearranged the landscape that lies before us.
Dating issues
Because the Cold War was not an active war but rather
a period of geopolitical tensions punctuated by proxy wars, disagreement exists
on the official ending of the conflict and the subsequent existence of the
post–Cold War era. Some scholars claim the Cold War ended when the world's
first treaty on nuclear disarmament was signed in 1987 and the end of the
Soviet Union as a superpower amid the Revolutions of 1989, but others state
that it truly ended only by the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union. Despite the
ambiguity, the end of the Cold War symbolized a victory of democracy and
capitalism and gave a boost to the rising world powers of the United States,
China, and India. Democracy became a manner of collective self-validation for
countries hoping to gain international respect. With democracy being seen as an
important value, political structures began adopting that value.
Trends
The era has mostly been dominated by the rise of
globalization (as well as by nationalism and populism in reaction), which was
enabled by the commercialization of the Internet and the growth of the mobile
phone system. The ideologies of postmodernism and cultural relativism have,
according to some scholars, replaced modernism and notions of absolute progress
and ideology. The post–Cold War era has enabled renewed attention to be paid to
matters that were ignored during the Cold War and has paved the way for
nationalist movements and internationalism. After the nuclear crises of the
Cold War, many nations found it necessary to discuss a new form of
international order and internationalism in which countries cooperated with one
another instead of using nuclear blackmail.
The period has seen the United States become by far
the most powerful country in the world and the rise of China from a
relatively-weak developing country to a fledgling emerging superpower. In
response to the rise of China, the United States has strategically sought to
"rebalance" the Asia-Pacific region, and at the same time, it began
to retreat from international commitments. It has also seen the European Union,
the merger of most of Europe into one economy, as well as a shift of power from
the G7 to the larger G20 economies. Accompanying NATO expansion, Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) systems were installed in Eastern Europe. Those marked
important steps in military globalization.
International co-operation
The end of the Cold War intensified hopes for
increasing international cooperation and strengthened international
organizations focused on approaching global issues.[6] That has paved way for
the establishment of international agreements such as the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the
Paris Climate Agreement. Also, environmentalism has become a mainstream concern
in the post–Cold War era after the circulation of widely-accepted evidence for
human activity's effects on Earth's climate. The same heightened consciousness
is true of terrorism, largely because of the September 11 attacks in the United
States and their aftermath.
Consequences of the fall of Soviet Union
The fall of the Soviet Union caused profound changes
in nearly every society in the world. Much of the policy and the infrastructure
of the Western world and the Eastern Bloc had revolved around the capitalist
and communist ideologies, respectively, and the possibility of a nuclear
warfare.
Government, economic, and military institutions
The fall of communism formed an existential threat for
many institutions. The United States military was forced to cut much of its
expenditure, but the level rose again to comparable heights after the September
11 attacks and the initiation of the War on Terror in 2001.
The end of the Cold War also coincided with the end of
apartheid in South Africa. Declining Cold War tensions in the later years of
the 1980s meant that the apartheid regime was no longer supported by the West
because of its anticommunism, but it was now condemned with an embargo. In
1990, Nelson Mandela was freed from prison and the regime made steps to end
apartheid. They on an official basis completed were 1994 with the new election,
which put Mandela into power.
Socialist and communist parties around the world saw
drops in membership after the Berlin Wall fell, and the public felt that free-market
ideology had won. Libertarian, neoliberal, nationalist and Islamist parties, on
the other hand, benefited from the fall of the Soviet Union. As capitalism had "won,"
as people saw it, socialism and communism in general declined in popularity.
Social-Democratic in Scandinavia countries privatized many of their
institutions in the 1990s, and a political debate on modern institutions was
reopened. Scandinavian nations are now more seen as social democrat (see Nordic
model).
The United States, having become the only global
superpower, used that ideological victory to reinforce its leadership position
in the new world order. It claimed “the United States and its allies are on the
right side of history.” The US also became the most dominant influence over the
newly-connecting global economy. However, the unipolar international system was
in tension with the emerging potential for a multipolar world as India, China,
and Japan developed to a point that they might challenge US hegemony. That
created new potential for worldwide conflict, ending the balance, from
mutually-assured destruction in the case of nuclear war, which had held the
world in a state of “long peace” throughout the Cold War.
The People's Republic of China, which had started to
move towards capitalism in the late 1970s and faced public anger after the
Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 in Beijing, moved even more quickly towards
free-market economics in the 1990s. McDonald's and Pizza Hut both entered the
country in the second half of 1990, the first American chains in China, aside
from Kentucky Fried Chicken, which had entered in 1987. Stock markets were
established in Shenzhen and Shanghai in late 1990 as well. Restrictions on car
ownership were loosened in the early 1990s and caused the bicycle to decline as
a form of transport by 2000.
The move to capitalism has increased the economic
prosperity of China, but many people still live in poor conditions and work for
companies for very low wages and in dangerous and poor conditions.
After the end of the Cold War, communism ended also in
Mongolia, Congo, Albania, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Angola. Now, only five
countries in the world are still ruled by communist single parties: China,
Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. Many other Third World countries had seen involvement
from the United States and/or the Soviet Union but solved their political
conflicts because of the removal of the ideological interests of those superpowers.
As a result of the apparent victory of democracy and capitalism in the Cold
War, many more countries adapted these systems, which also allowed them access
to the benefits of global trade, as economic power became more prominent than
military power in the international arena. However, as the United States
maintained global power, its role in many regime changes during the Cold War
went mostly officially unacknowledged, even when some, such as El Salvador and
Argentina, resulted in extensive human rights violations.
Q. 2 Write a detailed note on Realist Theories.
Realism theory in international relations is the most
dominant school of thought after World War II and until now it has relevance in
the present international politics. Realism had gained its popularity from
the late 1930s and early 1940s when the idealist approach had failed to analyze
the real politics throughout the world. The center points of realism are
State, Power, and Self-Interest.
The basic outlines of Realism in International
Relations
The basic outlines of Realism are –
- International
politics are anarchic.
- A
sovereign state is a principal actor in international politics.
- The
state is a rational unitary actor which acting under the consideration of
its own national interest
- National
security and Survival are the primary goals of the State.
- National
Power and capabilities determined the relations among states.
Origin of Realism Theory in International Relations
Though Realism theory in International relations has
emerged after the 1930s, the concept of realism has its own ancient tradition.
We find the concept of realism in the writings of several political thinkers
such as-
- Thucydides (460BC-406BC),
- Niccolo
Mechiavelli, (1469-1527),
- Thomas
Hobbes (1588-1679) and
- Jean-Jacques
Rousseau (1712-1778)
- Chanakya’
(370BC-283BC)
Thucidydes (460BC-406BC)
Thucydides was an ancient
Greek historian who wrote the ‘History of the Peloponnesian War’. In this book,
he described the intellectual forerunner of realpolitik. Realpolitik refers to
the political realists’ perspective of looking at world politics especially
from the viewpoint of human nature.
This war was originally between Athens and Sparta. By
profession he was a military of Athens and this book was participant’s
observer’s diary. In exploring the cause of this war, he shows how Athens’s
ability to grow and the lack of a sense of Spartan security led to a
totalitarian movement throughout Greece.
The main part of this war was ‘The Melian Dialogue’.
When Athens attacked Melos and proposed to surrender but the council of Melos
refused it and said that “…we invite you to allow us to be friends of yours and
enemies to neither side, to make a treaty which shall be agreeable to both you
and us, and so to leave out country”.
It was an attempt to preserve self-esteem. Naturally,
Athens destroyed the Melos and establishes itself. The policy of Athens was
that “ the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and
that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do the weak accept what
they accept”. It was also a method of establishing the dominance of a powerful
state.
Niccolo Mechiavelli (1469-1527)
Niccolo Mechiavelli, an Italian philosopher wrote a
famous book called “The Prince”. This book was also considered as a guidebook
which told that what a prince should actually be and the ways he should wield
his power in order to gain and maintain his sway over his state.
He said in his book that “ …a Prince, and especially a
new prince, cannot observe all these things which are considered good in men,
being often obliged, in order to maintain the state, to act against faith,
against charity, against humanity, and against religion.”
That means The Prince of State can rise in the
interest of the state in humanitarian rituals and make immoral decisions if
necessary. The Prince’s main task is the protection of the state’s interests
and in pursuing that purpose, the Prince can refute the principles adopted in
his life.
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)
However, the support of political realities is most
likely to be found in the book ‘Leviathan’ by Thomas hobbes.
Following Hobbes’s statement, ideas of unending and perpetual anarchy in the
state of nature and the endless struggle for survival have brought in
international relations.
The main cause of this anarchy and endless struggle in
the state of nature lies in the basic characteristics of human nature. The man
in the Hobbesian state of nature was the man to be the enemy of every man for
three principal causes. These are Competition, Diffidence, and Glory. ‘The life
of man was solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778)
The fact that Jean-Jacques Rousseau speaks
of the state’s role in describing the international situation in his ‘The State
of War‘ article is largely in line with the realist statements of recent times.
He said that “…it (the state) can always grow bigger; it feels weak so long as
there are others stronger than itself. Its safety and preservation demand that
it makes itself stronger than its neighbors. It cannot increase, foster,
or exercise its strength except at their expense, and even if has no need to
seek for provisions beyond its borders, it searches ceaselessly for new members
to give itself a more unshakable position.”
Chanakya’ (370BC-283BC)
Indian writer Chanakya’s ‘Arthashastra’ is a
great example for discussion the principles of statecraft, written in Sanskrit
which means ‘the Science of Material Gain’ or ‘Science of Polity’. In
fact, in this book of Chanakya, a broader section discusses foreign policy,
defense, and war issues.
According to him, the main goal of the king in terms
of policy would be to increase the power of the state, to expand the empire,
and to destroy the enemy. In addition, Chanakya’s advice is that peace is much
more desirable than war and the king will behave properly in victory or defeat.
“One should neither submit spinelessly nor sacrifice oneself in foolhardy
valor. It is better to adopt such policies as would enable one to survive and
live to fight another day”.
Classical Realism
E.H Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau are the inventors of
classical realism in international relations.
E.H Carr
E.H Carr famous book ‘The Twenty Years Crisis’ (1939)
lays the foundation for this theory. However, the book is more a criticism of
contemporary idealism than a discussion of the theory of international
relations.
According to him, idealists are more influenced by
dreams neither than thought, nor by standardization than observation. According
to him, political realism will be established through a critique perspective
and will look at real events as a result of their causality and consequence.
Idealists are berth in the role of power in the international field and
identify power as the root cause of conflict.
The ideals that these thinkers say, such as the end of
the war through collective security, the management of foreign policy through
the consent of the people instead of diplomacy, are all but attempts to protect
the interests of the winning group.
He also thinks that in the case of inconsistent
politics, the powerful groups themselves talk about maintaining peace and
domination, just as the governing groups maintain peace, just as in the
international field, the powerful states talk about maintaining peace. Any
state should increase its national strength and resist the power of the
powerful state through the balance of power.
Hans J. Morgenthau
Hans J. Morgenthau’s ‘ Politics among Nations:
The Struggle for Power and Peace’ is the finest book in the classical realist
theory. He believes that the science of international relations will be made
through the tradition of real-life events and by the proper application of
meaningful law.
According to him, the theory will be realistic,
independent, insightful, and consistent with empirical reality.
He gives six principles of political realism.
These ares-
- Politics
is governed by objective laws which have their root in human nature.
- The
key to understanding international politics is the concept of interest
defined in terms of power.
- The
forms and nature of state power will vary in time, place and context but
the concept of interest remains consistent.
- Universal
moral principles do not guide state behavior, although this does not rule
out an awareness of the moral significance of political action.
- Moral
aspirations are specific to a particular nation; there is no universally
agreed set of moral principles.
- The
political sphere is autonomous, meaning that the key question in
international politics is ‘How does this policy affect the power of the
nation?’
Neo Realism
Neoliberalism was created to overcome the criticism
that began in the realism discourse, due to its failure to acknowledge the
importance of economics in international relations and the changing role of the
establishment of different non state actors or establishment in the context of
changing economics.
Kenneth Waltz
In the late 1970s, this theory gains its
importance. Kenneth Waltz in his ‘Theory of International Politics‘ (1979)
states the basic idea of this theory. According to him, the main theories of
conventional international relations, whether it be system theory or Marxist
theory, are mainly theories.
These theories explain international relations in some
element or combination of them. But they have never been able to explain
international relations through structure. There are mainly two objectives of
neo-realism.
- Firstly,
interpreting the discussion of state-based international relations through
a structure.
- Secondly,
try to explain the tendency to interpret international relations through
political and military relations, through political realism and
economic tradition.
- According
to Waltz there are three key elements of neo-realism
- The
ordering principles of the system.
- The
character of the units in the system
- The
distribution of the capabilities of the units in the system.
He further noted that the main constitutive
principle of international affairs is the anarchy and the absence of
international authority. The main goal of all states is to increase their power
through self-defense and military development.
Basic Assumptions of Realism
From the above discussion we can say that the entire
realist focuses on the three key areas which also can be considered as three
basic assumption of realism theory in international relations. Statism
According to realism, state is the main actor and
sovereignty is the distinguishing character of the state. The prime goal of a
state is to assure its security.
In the domestic sphere, the problem of order and
security can be solved. But outside of the state, in the international sphere
among independent sovereign states, insecurity, danger, and threats are
continuously exist. To them, in anarchy, every state competes with other
states for power and security.
Survival
In this anarchy, the pre-eminent goal of every state
is survival. Increasing power and assure security is the goal of a state but
survival is the precondition to attaining this goal. According to defensive
realist Waltz, security is the principal interest of the state, therefore they
seek to increase their power for their survival. To offensive realist
Mearsheimer, the ultimate goal of a state is to establish a hegemonic position
in the international system. That means the state always desire more power to
sustain their security.
Self-Help
In the international system, there is an absence of
central authority to counter the use of force by one state to another state.
Security is always being realized through self-help so the possibility of war
is always. Waltz rightly said that ‘ self-help is necessarily the principle of
action’.
Q.3 What is the role of China and Russia in
maintaining peaceful atmosphere in Asia. Discuss the scenario, while focusing
on Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan.
China-Russia relations in Central Asia are attracting
increasing attention from scholars and policymakers. Most analysis thus far,
however, has employed the competition framework in examining this relationship.
In contrast to these studies, this article argues that since the independence
of Central Asia, the relationship between the two great powers in the region
has been predominantly that of cooperation. When the two nations did engage in
competition, it was limited, and did not evolve into direct confrontation. This
article proceeds in explaining the bases for China-Russia ongoing cooperation
in Central Asia, followed by clarifying the nature of the bilateral
competition, as well as explaining China’s key policies towards Russia, and
finally, outlining the future prospects for China-Russia relations in the
region.
The Bases for Bilateral Cooperation in Central Asia
Central Asia is an important region for China-Russia
relations. Geographically positioned between the two countries, it helps
maintain some distance between the two great powers, but also facilitates
closer bilateral ties. Both China and Russia have special geographic,
historical, and humanitarian ties with Central Asia, and maintain close
political, economic, and security relations with the region. From a traditional
geopolitical perspective, competition should dominate China-Russia engagement
there. Ever since the independence of Central Asia, Russia has been carefully
watching over the region to ensure that no other country encroaches on its
interests there. At the same time, China has been eager to develop deeper ties
with its Central Asian neighbors. Therefore, it is easy to imagine how
conflicts could arise between China and Russia in managing their Central Asia
objectives. The discussion below, however, shows that there are substantial
bases for cooperation, facilitated by a strong foundation in bilateral relations,
the institutional framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and
their shared interests in the region.
Solid Foundation
One could argue that China-Russia collaboration in
Central Asia is a product of a strong bilateral relationship, without which
collaboration would be either unstable or non-existent. Ever since the
mid-1990s, China-Russia relations have been evolving at a fast pace, in part
due to the deteriorating ties between the United States and the two countries
respectively. In the 1990s, China-US relations remained in the “cooling off
phase,” while Russia-US relations slipped from strategic partnership to “cold
peace.” The relations with the United States were further tested by a series of
crises. The 1999 US bombing of the Chinese embassy in the former Yugoslavia
sparked a serious crisis in China-US relations. The 2001 Hainan Island incident
further deepened the bilateral drift. As for US-Russia relations, by ignoring
Russia’s strong opposition to intervention in Yugoslavia and launching an
offensive there, the United States caused a stalemate in bilateral ties.
Moreover, it withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which
meant disintegration of cooperation on disarmament issues. Given this
international context, the strategic bases for collaboration between China and
Russia deepened. They announced their strategic partnership on April 25, 1996,
at the outset of the first Shanghai-5 summit. This partnership and the
Shanghai-5 formed almost simultaneously. This leads us to the next factor
facilitating regional cooperation: the institutional framework of the SCO.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Prior to the establishment of the Shanghai-5 in 1996,
which included China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, the
China-Russia relationship in the region was limited to resolving border issues.
Following this initial gathering, the leaders of these countries convened every
year, and in 2001, established the SCO, which has served as an important
platform for China-Russia cooperation in Central Asia and has had significant
influence on their interactions in the region. Without the SCO framework, they
would have had to resort to separate channels for engaging in Central Asia, and
had fewer opportunities for interacting, let alone forming a partnership. The
lack of institutional framework for cooperation would inevitably have
exacerbated suspicions on both sides, sharply increasing the risk of
confrontation. While some sceptics contend that Russia entered the SCO with the
sole purpose of “watching over” China, I argue that even if Russia was
guided by this reasoning, “watching over” still requires some interactions and
can facilitate positive outcomes.
The SCO has greatly increased opportunities for
China-Russia interactions on many levels. It has gradually enlarged its
framework for cooperation, as demonstrated by annual heads of state meetings,
prime ministers’ meetings, as well as recurrent meetings among government
officials in diplomacy, national defense, security, law enforcement, trade,
transportation, science and technology, education, and cultural spheres, among
others. The cooperation also includes interactions among non-governmental and
civil organisations from the participant countries. While it remains
challenging to measure the exact influence these ongoing meetings have had on
spurring closer ties between China and Russia, there is undoubtedly a positive
correlation between the two.
Other than facilitating direct interactions between
China and Russia, the SCO created new common interests for collaboration. They
include working on anti-terrorism, regional security and stability, disease
prevention, as well as development of regional transport and energy
cooperation, and good neighborly relations. The SCO also internationalized
China-Russia cooperation and allowed for wider publicity of its key initiatives
and results.
In addition, it institutionalized interactions between
the two great powers by establishing some “rules of the game.” The
international meetings produced numerous declarations, conventions, as well as
explicit and tacit agreements. These evolved into important principles for
mutual engagement, which helped institutionalize China-Russia relations in the
region. Finally, the SCO created a “buffer” for China-Russia relations by
establishing a mechanism for orderly resolution of conflicts, allowing each
side to present its stance and to make mutual adjustments.
Mutual Strategic Interests
Mutual interests in Central Asia further solidify
China-Russia cooperation in the region. Alexander Lukin, argues that there are
three, key, common interests uniting them there: upholding political stability,
safeguarding secular regimes, and promoting economic development in the
region. In my view, the mutual regional interests extend beyond these
three areas. They include upholding stability in the border regions, as well as
providing for wider regional security and stability.
As for border security, I refer here mainly to
protecting the border region between China and Central Asia (China and Russia
only share a border of about 50km. in Central Asia). This collaboration is
demonstrated by Russia’s signing onto the 1996 agreement/treaty “concerning
strengthening trust in the military domain in the border regions,” and the 1997
agreement “concerning mutual reduction of military forces in the border
regions.” Moreover, Russia was the key representative on the side of
Russia-Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan in border negotiations with China.
Therefore, China and Russia share a common responsibility and a long-term
interest in upholding the border security treaties.
Another important area of common interest for the two
countries with regard to Central Asia is that of upholding regional security,
which mainly refers to fighting terrorism, separatism, and extremism.
Xinjiang and Central Asia have countless linkages due to historic, ethnic,
cultural, linguistic and religious factors. Central Asia also presents a key
gateway for Xinjiang into Southwest and South Asia, as well as to Arab and
Middle East countries, which facilitates the international development of the
East Turkestan independence movement. Chinese authorities, therefore, regard
Central Asia as of high strategic importance in combatting this movement.
Russia’s concern for security in Central Asia is
connected to its security objectives in the Caucuses and in its Southern
regions. From Russia’s perspective, Central Asia is not only a source of
danger, but also a transmitter of it. In the words of Oleg Chernov, the former
vice-secretary at the Russian Security Council: “Central Asia not only produces
security threats and challenges to regional stability, but it is also an
intermediary actor, an importer of external threats.”
Given the fragility of the Central Asian region, it
has struggled with casting off these threats. The two countries perceive
Central Asia’s security risks as threatening to their domestic interests, and
therefore, are willing to collaborate in helping to mitigate these challenges,
which are unlikely to be eliminated in the near future, thereby requiring
long-term cooperative efforts from China and Russia.
Closely linked to the security objective, the two
nations also hold a mutual interest in upholding regional stability. China and
Russia both believe that stability in Central Asia, to a large extent,
translates into wider regional stability, and is, therefore, in the strategic
interest of both nations. Upholding regional stability includes maintaining
political and societal stability, as well as peaceful inter-regional relations.
There are important reasons for China and Russia to set regional stability as a
priority. Geographically, Central Asia is on the periphery for both, perceived
as a strategic “backyard.” Stability is conducive for maintaining peace in
their periphery, upholding the existing framework for bilateral cooperation in
the region, and facilitating peaceful relations among the two countries and the
Central Asian states, as well as for developing trade and economic ties with
them. From the perspective of China and Russia, a serious political, economic,
or security upheaval in the region would be extremely detrimental not only for
the region, but also for their strategic interests there. China and Russia’s
interest in maintaining stability in the region, therefore, makes them in favor
of the political status quo there, as stability and status quo are connected.
Neither has openly declared maintaining the political status quo as its policy
objective, but their concern for regional stability has led them both to be
apprehensive about sharp structural political change.
Finally, China and Russia also hold negative views on
the US and NATO’s military activities in the region. Both are concerned about
the long-term US military presence there, which similarly impacts their
regional standing. After 9/11, the US posted military forces there, to which
China and Russia did not object. However, they perceive the long-term military
presence of the United States as a potential geostrategic challenge. Following
the 2005 “color revolutions,” China and Russia further strengthened their
cooperation in preventing political unrest in Central Asia. Both resist US
political transformation in the region, believing that it likely leads to
regional instability.
The Perceived China-Russia Competition in Central Asia
The key framework for the Sino-Russia relationship in
Central Asia is that of collaboration. Russian authorities do not perceive
Russia’s relations with China in Central Asia as that of competition. Lukin
dismisses this as a “myth.” China and Russia constitute two distinct major
powers, and the fact that they have divergent perspectives and interests with
regard to some issues in Central Asia is only to be expected. It would be
incorrect to equate differences to competition. Exaggerating the nature of
competition can create the appearance of the bilateral relationship resembling
a game of chess, which would be inconsistent with the reality on the ground.
In my opinion, there are three sources of competition
between China and Russia in Central Asia. The first is their geopolitical
positions in the region. Both attempt to exert influence in political,
economic, and security domains, and it is, therefore, impossible to completely
avoid clashes of interest. Central Asia has been under the dominance of Russia
for over a century, whereas China is a “newcomer” to the region, whose goal is
solely to engage with Central Asia, rather than to obstruct Russia’s regional
intentions. Russia, however, does not seem to grasp that, and continues to view
China’s involvement with some apprehension. Although China and Russia have
already managed to achieve strategic compromises and regional cooperation, the
conventional geopolitical thinking still persists, and gives rise to some
mutual competition. However, this display of competition is not systematic, and
is not the dominant feature of the bilateral relationship.
Mutual interest in Central Asia’s natural resources is
another source of competition. Until recently, Russia dominated this market.
Controlling natural resources and oil pipelines not only provided economic
benefits, but also strategic ones. It meant controlling the pillars of Central
Asia’s economy and strengthening Russia’s global negotiating capacity. Given
the EU’s dependency on energy imports from Russia, Russia could use it as
leverage in relations with the EU. It, therefore, perceives China’s recent
involvement in this sector, including construction of oil and gas pipelines,
which reduces Central Asia’s dependency on Russia, as a challenge to its
interests.
Bilateral competition for natural resources, however,
has not translated into political confrontation between the two nations.
Competition has remained within the commercial sphere and has, thus far, not
shifted into the political realm. Moreover, even from the economic perspective
this competition has not infringed on Russia’s commercial interests as much as
some predicted. First, it is important to stress that the Central Asian states
were the key initiators of diversification of their energy exports. The
China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline, for instance, was initially sought by
Kazakhstan. Moreover, China is not the first to break through Russia’s energy
monopoly. Western oil companies entered the region well before China’s initial
engagement there in 1997. The plan to bypass Russia with the Baku-Ceyhan oil
pipeline, announced in 1990 and put on the agenda in 1999, won strong support
from the United States and other Western countries. Its political objective was
precisely to weaken Central Asia’s dependency on energy exports to Russia. In
addition, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan’s oil and gas production has continued to
increase, alleviating the competition for resources in the region. Finally,
since Russia has been mainly importing Central Asian gas to resell it to
Europe, Europe’s decline in demand for gas following the financial crisis,
might translate into Russia’s weaker demand for these resources in the future.
Another competitive element in China-Russia engagement
in Central Asia is that of economic integration. China has actively encouraged
economic integration with its periphery regions, as demonstrated by its
approach to Northeast and Southeast Asia. It has hoped to expand economic
integration with Central Asia through a solid institutional framework. Russia,
especially under President Putin, has also continuously been pursuing economic
integration with these former Soviet territories. In October 2011, Putin put
forward an ambitious plan for regional integration, envisioning four successive
phases: formation of a customs union, a Eurasian common economic space, a
Eurasian economic union, and finally the Eurasian Union. The customs union
would include Central Asia, which would be positioned within Russia’s orbit. China
and Russia, therefore, both hold plans for economic integration with Central
Asia, but their strategies sharply diverge, giving rise to potential conflicts.
As Russia considers Central Asia as the zone of its influence, it objects to
SCO consideration of closer regional integration. China raised the possibility
of establishing a free trade zone twice within the SCO framework. Russia
neither openly opposed it, nor expressed any support for it, leaving the issue
ambiguous. The Russian president’s special representative to the SCO,
Ambassador Kirill Barskii, stated: “With regard to the SCO’s regional economic
cooperation….we will not consider it in the future. Integration of the Eurasian
region should be that of forming a customs alliance/union under the leadership
of the Eurasian economic union, which is currently being formed, and which
could have cooperative relations with the SCO.” This demonstrates Russia’s
opposition to regional economic integration under the SCO.
The practice of multilateral diplomacy by Central
Asian states, however, helps mitigate possible competition between China and
Russia and to foster their collaborative relations in the region. Central Asian
states’ pursuit of balance of power in the region helps them manoeuvre between
the major neighboring powers. For instance, Turkmenistan even chose to pursue
the policy of “positive neutrality.” Central Asian states, therefore, also play
an active role in shaping the relations between China and Russia in a positive
direction.
China’s Policies towards Russia in Central Asia
China has been treating Russia as a strategic partner
in Central Asia, and has strived towards bilateral cooperation in the region.
It has no intention to compete with Russia, let alone to push Russia out from
Central Asia. If its economic influence has been rapidly expanding, this is
merely a consequence of China’s economic development, and is not aimed at
counteracting Russia. In September 2013, during his visit to Kazakhstan,
President Xi Jinping put forward the concept of “Silk Road Economic Zone,”
which is perceived as China’s strategy to the region.
There are two points to consider in evaluating the
scope of this concept. First, it allows for the participation of members of the
Eurasian economic community, as well as members and observers of the SCO. The
SCO has six members: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan, as well as five observers: Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Iran, and
Afghanistan. The Eurasian economic community has five members, Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. With the exception of Belarus, all the
members are also SCO members. Therefore, the members and observers of the SCO
are also seen as participants in the Silk Road Economic Zone.
Second, according to an official statement on the Silk
Route Economic Zone, it will involve three billion people, the combined
population of the member and observer countries in the SCO (China: 1.3 billion;
Russia: 140 million; Central Asia: 60 million; India: 1.2 billion; Pakistan:
200 million; Iran: over 75 million; and Afghanistan: about 30 million).
Thus, the scope of the Silk Road Economic Zone
consists of the above-mentioned countries, a vast region. China lies on its
east side, Iran on the west side, India in the south, and Eastern Europe in the
north. The zone encompasses East Asia, Central Asia, Southwest Asia, South
Asia, and Eurasia. Given that the Silk Road Economic Zone is still an evolving
concept, however, it might not necessarily be limited to this region, and its scope
could be expanded in the future.
According to the official explanation, the basic role
of the Silk Road Economic Zone lies in implementing five functions:
communicating policies, connecting roads, strengthening trade, circulating
currency, and communicating popular sentiments. Policy communication points to
mutual consultation and understanding in the political arena. Connecting roads
mainly refers to the creation of a regional transport network, which involves
building and fixing roads, as well as implementing appropriate policies.
Strengthening trade means eliminating trade barriers, as well as improving
irrational regulations and inefficient border-crossing procedures. Fostering
currency circulation refers to carrying out trade in local currencies, and
thereby realising local-currency convertibility. Finally, communication of
popular sentiments signifies fostering more non-governmental exchanges and
stronger inter-regional friendship.
Many people might raise the question of whether the
Silk Road Economic Zone is directed against Russia. In my opinion, this is not
the case. The hope is to avoid conflicts with Russia. This is evident by the
fact that this zone does not include the former Soviet territories that Russia
deems most sensitive, and it does not involve creation of a free trade zone,
which Russia has not supported. Moreover, China declared that it would not
strive for hegemony in the region. Rather, it seeks to work together with
Russia and the Central Asian states to increase communications and
collaboration. China does not seek to push Russia aside, but is willing to
strengthen harmonious ties.
China’s cooperative stance is clearly demonstrated by
its attitude towards Russia’s plans for Eurasian economic integration and
continued military presence in the region. Russia aims to bring Central Asia
under its political, economic, and security system, while China continues to
actively develop its relations with Central Asia. On the surface, these two
processes appear to be in conflict; however, China is unlikely to oppose or
present obstacles for Russia’s integration plans. Its strategic thinking
centers on participation, not control. It wants to increase its presence, but
not at the expense of reducing that of Russia. China understands Russia’s historic
ties with Central Asia and respects its interests.
Other than promoting tight economic integration,
Russia has maintained a heavy military presence in Central Asia. It established
long-term military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and won permission from
other Central Asian states to maintain some military presence there as well.
Moreover, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is basically an
inter-governmental military alliance, which grants Russia’s military forces
access to the region. This presence is long-term and likely to intensify.
China, however, has, thus far, not expressed any objection to Russia’s actions,
which clearly signifies a different attitude from that shown to the US military
presence in Central Asia. Russia’s military presence in the region has a
history of over one hundred years and is ongoing, rather than a sporadic,
provocative attempt at demonstrating military prowess. In fact, after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian forces have continued to be deployed in
Tajikistan and assist in guarding its borders. The strong bilateral
relationship between China and Russia has also helped mitigate China’s
suspicions. The common aim of fighting terrorism and upholding regional
stability means that Russia’s military presence can be of long-term strategic
importance and mutual benefit rather than a threat to China’s regional
interests.
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen — and many
of their neighbors — not only have extremely poor governance, and high levels
of corruption, they are under intense pressure from increases in population,
urbanization, and social change that go far beyond their current problems with
any given groups of extremists. These problems are so serious that they are
likely to lead to further extremism, and civil conflict for at least the next
decade. They also are so serious that no attempt at dealing with major threats
from extremism, terrorism, or insurgency can be successful if it only focuses
on the security and military dimensions of such threats. The same is true of
any efforts that focus on peace negotiations and short-term recovery aid.
“Nation-building” does impose massive challenges of its own, but ignoring the
forces that create “failed states” will not only make any truly successful effort
at conflict resolution impossible, but will almost ensure the rise or
resurgence of terrorism and civil conflict.This analysis does not attempt to
simplify the range of factors involved or to find a single set of main causes
of extremism, terrorism, and insurgency. It does not attempt to offer simply or
optimistic answers to problems that need far more in-depth analysis, and where
it may be impossible to find truly workable solutions until a given state is
finally driven to the point where it is ready to help itself. In the real
world, the only practical choice may be to contain the threats in a given
country to its own territory – a form of strategic triage that must give
priority to countries that are actually willing to address their civil
challenges and have the unity to act.
The goal of this analysis is to demonstrate the full
level of complexity involved, and to suggest that any successful effort must
look beyond defeating current enemies, look beyond current military and
security trends, and look beyond the more immediate and topical civil causes of
extremism like leadership, politics, and extremist ideologies.
The Key Long-Term Forces that Create “Failed States”
The analysis focuses on exploring the deep structural
reasons these five nations have become “failed states,” and comparing the civil
trends involved. Its Table of Contents is shown below, and it shows that the
study focuses on the civil side of civil-military relations. It attempts to
find quantitative metrics that illustrate the importance of each key factor,
and examines key longer-term trends in the following forces that will make
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen enduring problems:
The enduring civil costs of terrorism, insurgency and
civil war, and their post conflict impact.
The impact of key problems in governance that are
often largely independent of a particular leader and the country’s political
system – whether democratic or authoritarian.
Q. 4 Explain in detail the status of Muslim Countries in
world and their impact on world politics? Discuss the role of OIC.
The majority of its member states are Muslim-majority
countries, while others have significant Muslim populations, including several
African and South American countries.
While the 22 members of the Arab League are also
part of the OIC, the organisation has several significant non-Arab member
states, including Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.
It also has five observer members,
including Russia and Thailand.
The organisation has permanent delegations to the UN
and the European Union and its official languages are Arabic, English
and French.
Why was the OIC established?
The OIC first met in Morocco in September 1969, a
month after an arson attack inside the Al-Aqsa Mosque that destroyed part of
the roof and the 800-year-old pulpit of Salahuddin, best known for
recapturing Jerusalem from the Crusaders in the 12th
century. Reacting to the incident, representatives from 24 Muslim
countries met in the capital Rabat to establish a body that would promote
cooperation across the Muslim world.
In March 1970, the first Islamic Conference of Foreign
Ministers was held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and plans for setting up a
permanent secretariat for the OIC were established.
Issues relating to Palestine have been
central to the OIC’s agenda and summit discussions. The organisation has
continuously condemned what member states
consider Israeli aggressions against the Palestinians. Other issues
that have also taken centre stage in OIC summits include the wars
in Bosnia and Iraq, a rise in the number of refugees from
Muslim-majority countries such as Syria, as well
as Islamophobia in the West.
Objectives and role
According to its charter, the OIC aims to preserve
Islamic values, safeguard and defend the national sovereignty and independence
of member states and to contribute to international peace and security. While
the organisation has been known for its cultural and social projects, its
political influence has been relatively limited.
“Typically, in the past, the OIC has been effective in
promoting cultural and educational projects across the Muslim world,” Sami
Hamdi, a Middle East expert, told Al Jazeera. “However, its political
capabilities remain severely limited.”
According to Mamoon Alabbasi, a political analyst
focusing on the Middle East and North Africa region, while the OIC has relative
political weight, its rhetoric does not always translate into action on the
ground.
“With 57 member states… the OIC carries a [relatively]
heavy political weight… [and] impact. But how much change that makes on the
ground is not always clear,” said Alabbasi.
Adding to its political limitations is its inability
to unify its stance on issues, say experts.
“Like other international organisations, such as the
UN General Assembly, the OIC is supposed to have a unified voice but it does
not because policies of the individual countries greatly differ,” said
Alabbasi.
“Most importantly, the OIC doesn’t have a unified
voice because most of its member countries are not democracies. So, while their
populations may be in agreement [over an issue] they do not always represent
the views of their populations.”
Hamdi agrees: “The OIC has a broad spectrum of
different cultures. This means that on the political front, even if there is a
united stance, it means very little, practically.”
Is the OIC relevant and effective?
Like other intergovernmental organisations, although
resolutions issued by the OIC are not usually followed by action, statements
usually point towards member states’ “red lines” that they cannot cross, say
experts.
“If you want to know what position member states can
take in the eyes of their own public, statements by the OIC are reflective of
that. They [statements] show their [member states’] limits,” explained
Alabbasi. Because the OIC includes a significant number of Arab states
among its membership, it has often been compared with the Arab League.
While the two organisations share many similarities,
the main difference lies in the OIC’s limited politicisation compared with the
Arab League, say analysts.
“The Arab League is more of a political entity than
the OIC given the close proximity of its members and the, often joint, threat
that the countries have had to face in the past,” according to Hamdi. According
to Alabbasi, because of its wider scope of membership, a lack of consensus
within the OIC sets it farther apart from the Arab League.
“The OIC is very different in the sense that member
states cannot get a consensus across,” said Alabbasi
“But in other organisations such as the GCC, and to a
lesser extent the Arab League, there tends to be an agreement on issues in
broad terms, as opinions are similar, even if there is some disagreement,”
added Alabbasi.
How does the OIC operate?
The OIC holds an Islamic Summit once every three
years. At the summit, heads of state discuss ways to achieve the charter’s
objectives and make policy decisions that concern its member states. Talha
Abdulrazaq, a Middle East expert at the University of Exeter’s Strategy and
Security Institute, explained how OIC decisions and resolutions are much like
they are at UN General Assembly.
“Member states each get a vote. Each member state can
table a resolution and then others can vote on it or suggest tweaks.
“But much like the GA, OIC resolutions aren’t binding.
They are just a declaration of the general feeling of the leaders of the
Islamic world,” said Abdulrazaq.
Meeting on a more regular basis, the council of
foreign ministers convenes annually to evaluate the implementation of the
organisation’s policies and objectives. The general secretariat, the
OIC’s executive body, is responsible for implementing those decisions.
Q.5 International Integration. Focusing on Europe and
their treaties. Do you suggest such integrations for Asia?
International integration implies the adoption of
policies by separate countries as if they were a single political unit. The
degree of integration is often tested by seeing whether interest rates or share
prices or the prices of goods are the same in different national markets.
If we define integration as providing equal economic
opportunities, however unequal the initial endowments and achievements of
members of the integrated area, the world was more integrated at the end of the
nineteenth century than it is today. Although tariff barriers in countries
other than the United Kingdom were higher then (20 to 40 percent, compared with
less than 5 percent now), nontariff barriers were much lower; capital and money
movements were freer under the gold standard (that is, without the deterrent to
trade of variable exchange rates); and the movement of people was much freer:
passports were rarely needed and citizenship was granted easily.
Functions of an integrated system
Today, the four functions carried out by an integrated
international system aiming to achieve development are fragmented. These are
(1) the generation of current account surpluses by the center (that is, the
dominant power); (2) the conversion of these surpluses by financial
institutions into loans or investments on acceptable terms; (3) the production
and sale of producer goods and up-to-date technology; and (4) the maintenance
and, when necessary, use of military power to keep peace and enforce contracts.
Before 1914, these four functions were exercised by the United Kingdom as the
dominant power; between the wars, there was no international order, with the
United Kingdom no longer being able, and the United States not yet willing, to
accept these functions; for a quarter of a century after World War II, they
were exercised and coordinated by the United States. But today we live in a
schizophrenic, fragmented world without coordination. The current account
surpluses were generated in the 1970s by a few oil-rich Gulf sheikdoms, later
by the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, and more recently—since the
reunification of Germany—mainly by Japan. Financial institutions have
mushroomed all over the world; they are not only in London and New York but
also in Tokyo, Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Zurich, the
Cayman Islands, the Isle of Jersey, the British Virgin Islands, Cyprus,
Antigua, Liechtenstein, Panama, the Netherlands Antilles, The Bahamas, Bahrain,
Luxembourg, Switzerland, and elsewhere. And the economically strong countries
such as Germany and Japan were strong partly because they did not spend much on
the military.
Nontariff barriers to trade imposed by the member
countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
and restrictions on international migration have prevented fuller global
integration. The result is deflation, unemployment, and slow or negative growth
in many countries of the South. But the present fragmentation provides us, for
the first time, with the opportunity to coordinate these four functions and to
build a world order based on equality rather than dominance and dependence. It
is a challenge to our institutional imagination to design ways to implement
this new order.
Between 1870 and 1914, the world was integrated
unwittingly. By imposing fewer objectives on government policy, and by
accepting what, in retrospect, appeared to be irrational constraints—such as
the gold standard and, consequentially, fixed exchange rates and lack of
freedom to pursue expansionist monetary policies, and the discipline of
balanced budgets—different countries were integrated into a single world
economy. It was dominated by one power, the United Kingdom. Domestic policies
were severely constrained by the need to adhere to the gold standard. Today the
principal constraints on national policies are created by the activities of
multinational companies and banks.
Later, many objectives of government policy were added
to the night-watchman-state's duty to maintain law and order: among them were
full employment, economic growth, price stability, wage maintenance, reduced
inequality in income distribution, regional balance, protection of the natural
environment, and greater opportunities for women and minorities. The rejection
of constraints, such as fixed exchange rates and limits on the discretion of
monetary and fiscal policies, led to greater integration of national economies
by encouraging full employment and creation of the welfare state; but, at the
same time, it led to international disintegration. Such disintegration is,
however, entirely consistent with a high degree of international
interdependence. For interdependence exists when one country by unilateral
action can inflict harm on (or provide benefits to) other countries.
Competitive protectionism, devaluation, deflation, or pollution of the air and
sea beyond national boundaries are instances. A nuclear war resulting from
international disintegration would be perhaps the ultimate demonstration of
interdependence.
Interdependence is measured by the costs of severing
the relationship (or the benefits of developing it). The higher the costs to
one country, the greater is the degree of dependence of that country. If a
small country benefits more from the international division of labor than a
large country, its dependence is greater. If both partners to a transaction
were to incur high costs from severing economic links, there would be
interdependence.
Five qualifications
International interdependence is often said to be
strong and to have increased. International trade is taken to be an indicator
of interdependence, and its high and, with some interruptions, rapidly growing
values are accepted as evidence of the increasing interdependence of nations.
Between 1820 and 1992, world population increased 5-fold, income per head
8-fold, world income 40-fold, and world trade 540-fold (Maddison, 1995).
Sometimes international financial flows are taken as the measure of
interdependence. But five important qualifications to the notion that today's
globalization is unprecedented, large, and increasing should be pointed out
(see Streeten, 1989; and Wade, 1996).
First, if we consider the ratio of international trade
to national income, the rapid growth of the postwar decades can be viewed as a
return to pre-1914 values after the interruptions of two world wars, the Great
Depression, and high levels of protection. (It is often said that globalization
is irreversible. But history shows that it is highly reversible. After reaching
a peak in the late nineteenth century, it retreated until after World War II.) The
share of world exports in world GDP rose from 6 percent in 1950 to 16 percent
in 1992. For the industrial countries, the proportion of exports in GDP
increased from 12 percent in 1973 to 17 percent in 1992. For 16 major
industrial countries, it rose from 18.2 percent in 1900 to 21.2 percent in
1913. (See Nayyar, 1995, pp. 3-4.) The latter increase was largely the result
of dramatic reductions in transport costs, as well as of the decline in such
trade barriers as tariffs and import quotas and of the opening of new markets
such as China and Mexico. The comparisons in the ratios are very similar for
particular countries. This increase in the trade/GDP ratios occurred in spite
of a general increase in tariff protection between 1870 and 1913, especially
during the last three decades of the nineteenth century. It was therefore not
the result of trade liberalization. In the pre-1913 period of globalization,
the role of the state increased rather than decreased.
The total ratios of trade to GDP are, however, misleading.
Over the postwar decades, the share of services, including government services,
in GDP increased enormously. Many of these are, or were until recently, not
tradable. If we were to take only the ratio of international trade to the
production of goods, it would show a substantial increase compared with not
only the interwar period but also the period before 1913.
The second qualification to the notion that
unprecedented globalization is now taking place is that the developing
countries (and the groups within these countries) that have benefited from
growing trade (and also from foreign investment, which is highly concentrated
in East Asia, Brazil, Mexico, and now China) have been few, not more than a
dozen, although their number has grown. Twelve countries in Asia and Latin
America accounted for 75 percent of total capital flows, while 140 of 166
developing countries accounted for less than 5 percent of capital inflows
(López-Mejía, 1999). A large share of foreign investment is made by firms from
a handful of countries, in a narrow range of industries (UNCTAD, 1996). The
large, poor masses of the Indian subcontinent and of sub-Saharan Africa have
(at least so far) not benefited substantially from the growth of international
trade and investment. In fact, the bulk of the international flow of goods,
services, direct investment, and finance is between North America, Europe, and
Japan. The least developed countries accounted for only 0.1 percent of total
global investment inflows and for 0.7 percent of inflows to all developing
countries. Africa in particular has been almost completely bypassed. The 80
percent of the world's population that lives in developing countries accounts
for only 20 percent of world income (UNDP, 1997).
The third qualification is that direct foreign
investment constitutes a smaller portion of total investment in most countries
today than before 1914. Domestic savings and domestic investment are more
closely correlated than they were then, implying that even finance capital is
not very mobile. This is explained partly by the fact that government savings
play a greater role today than they did in the past and partly by floating
exchange rates, which increase uncertainties and are a barrier to long-term
commitments. This qualification is reinforced by the fact that although gross
capital flows are very large, net flows are not. Current account deficits and
surpluses are now a much smaller proportion of countries' GDPs than they were
between 1870 and 1913. During the 1980s, the United Kingdom ran a current
account surplus that averaged 8 percent of GNP and invested it overseas,
compared with 2-4 percent for the (west) German and Japanese surpluses (and the
U.S. deficit). But the fact remains that this is surprising in view of the
current preoccupation with the globalization of capital markets. The bulk of
foreign investment has been the capital inflow into the United States and the
outflow from Japan.
The fourth qualification is, as we have seen, that
there is much less international migration than during 1870-1913. Barriers to
immigration are higher now than they were then, when passports were unnecessary
and people could move freely from one country to another to visit or work.
Sixty million Europeans moved to the Americas, Australia, or other areas of new
settlement. In 1900, 14 percent of the U.S. population was foreign born,
compared with 8 percent today. (Electronic technology, however, has made labor
mobility much less important than it once was.)
The fifth qualification is that it is not the volume
or value or rate of growth of trade that should be accepted as an indicator of
economic interdependence but rather the damage that would be done by the
elimination of trade—that is, the effects on consumers' and producers'
surpluses. These are difficult to measure. On the one hand, we know that much
trade is conducted in only slightly differentiated goods, which could readily
be replaced by similar domestic products without great loss to buyers or great
increases in costs. There could, for example, be a large and rapidly growing
trade in slightly differentiated models of automobiles, produced at similar
costs, but there would not be much deprivation or loss if buyers had to
substitute home-produced models for imported ones.
On the other hand, a small and slowly growing volume
of trade could be of great importance and lead to substantial losses if it were
cut off. Like a link in a bicycle chain, it could, though small, make a big
difference to the working of the whole system. The United States, for example,
depends heavily on quite small imports of manganese, tin, and chromium. Before
World War I, trade was conducted largely as exchanges between raw materials and
manufactured products, for which consumers' and producers' surpluses are large.
Today the bulk of trade is intra-industry and even intrafirm trade of often
similar manufactured products for which these surpluses are much smaller.
Indeed, manufactured goods often contain parts from so many countries that it
is not possible to attribute their origin to any one country.
Globalization, according to some definitions, means
opening up to trade or liberalization. In the last decade, such liberalization
was undertaken mainly by the former socialist countries, which turned away from
central planning in order to link up with the world economy, and by the
developing countries, which changed from import-substituting industrialization
to export orientation accompanied by a partial dismantling of the state. This
liberalization was not the result of entirely free choices, but was a response
partly to global forces and to hopes of benefiting from global gains; partly to
pressures exerted by the World Bank and the IMF when working with member
countries on their stabilization and structural adjustment programs, as well as
by the rich countries' support for doctrines of state minimalism.
Some OECD countries, however, have put up additional
nontariff barriers, such as so-called voluntary export restraints; procedural
protection, most notably in the form of antidumping actions; and specific
subsidies to exports of goods and services competing with imports. The
Multifiber Arrangement and the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy are
blatantly protectionist devices. Other barriers have been raised against imports
of steel, electronics, and footwear.
Trade is, of course, only one, and not the most
important, of many manifestations of economic interdependence. Others are the
flow of factors of production—capital, technology, enterprise, and various
types of labor—across frontiers and the exchange of assets, the acquisition of
legal rights, and the international flows of information and knowledge. The
global flow of foreign exchange has reached the incredible figure of $2
trillion per day, 98 percent of which is speculative. The multinational
corporation has become an important agent of technological innovation and
technology transfer. In 1995, the sales of multinationals amounted to $7
trillion, with these companies' sales outside their home countries growing 20-30
percent faster than exports.
The EU currently has 27 member states. The table below
shows how the organisation has grown in size since the European Economic
Community (EEC) was founded in 1957, and has information about the major
changes that have taken place during that time. Apart from the 27 EU member
states, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein are also part of the single market
(the EU 27, plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein form the European Economic
Area (EEA)) Switzerland and the EU have a bilateral agreement (called the AFMP)
which gives the right for Swiss and EU citizens to move freely in each other’s
territory. In other words, Swiss citizens can live and work in the EU, and EU
citizens can live and work in Switzerland. Switzerland also takes part in other
aspects of the Single Market through various bilateral treaties.