Q.1 Evaluate this situation of Afghanistan after fall of Kabul in 2021. How the new government of Afghanistan lead by Taliban can impact the relationship between Afghanistan and
Pakistan?Predictions for Afghanistan following the
fall of Kabul, in 2021
After the fall of Kabul on August 16, most of
the city's streets were vacant, with shops closed and security checkpoints
unmanned, with the exception of the roads leading to the airport. However,
Taliban members were seen snapping pictures close to well-known Kabul sites
while displaying their flag and weaponry. Afghan government employees and human
rights advocates have reported being followed by Taliban troops while they
explore their neighbourhoods. A number of locals said that the Taliban
reinstated its restriction on women leaving their houses without a male
guardian in the days after the collapse. Additionally, several women-owned
establishments were forced to close their doors around the metropolis.
State-owned channels ceased airing almost everything except Taliban
pronouncements and Islamic lectures, while local stations started censoring
foreign and entertainment programming. Furthermore, the Taliban has begun
firing female journalists.
At their first official news conference on
August 17 in Kabul, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said the group wanted
to "assure the international community, including the United States that
nobody will be harmed in Afghanistan" and that "after consultations
that are going to be completed very soon, we will be witnessing the formation
of a strong Islamic and inclusive government." On August 21st, after being
absent for more than a decade, Taliban co-founder and political leader Abdul
Ghani Baradar returned to Kabul as the group launched internal deliberations on
how to administer the nation.
A statement welcoming former president Ghani
into the UAE on humanitarian grounds was released by the UAE Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation on the evening of August 18. On
August 19th, Ghani posted a video rejecting rumours that he was negotiating his
return to Afghanistan and that he had taken a big quantity of money with him
when he went. Many more government, military, and anti-Taliban personnel have
also escaped to India, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
Fearing that the new Taliban regime would use
their websites to identify and target civilians for reprisals, American government
agencies started removing public articles and photographs portraying Afghan
civilians in the days after the collapse. To further restrict Taliban access to
these cash, the United States administration declared that it would be
suspending $9.5 billion in assets belonging to Da Afghanistan Bank, the Afghan
national bank. The IMF has also said that the Taliban would be excluded from
any special drawing privileges. Financial services from Western Union and
MoneyGram were also halted in Afghanistan.
In addition, a number of online services,
including Facebook and YouTube, said that they will maintain their bans on
Taliban-related material. Facebook also implemented a lock account function so
Afghans could shield their personal data from the Taliban. The Taliban has
spoken out against such prohibitions, claiming that they violate their right to
free expression. A rise in the establishment of new, pro-Taliban accounts was
observed on Twitter, one of the few social media sites that have not blocked
the organisation, in the days following the collapse.
It was predictable that after the collapse of
Kabul and the Islamic Republic, there would be a large influx of people wanting
to flee the Taliban. As a result, several nations made public declarations in
the days after the Islamic Republic's overthrow about the total number of
migrants they intended to accept. More than 300,000 Afghan civilians who had
worked with the US were in danger after the liberation of Kabul. To protect
these individuals from danger, the international community coordinated an
airlift. The United States took the lead on this effort, and by the end of the
airlift on August 31, more than 123,000 people had been safely evacuated.
Tensions were high at the airport as the
airlift attempted to evacuate thousands of people was met with resistance from
the Taliban. At the international airport, 13 American servicemen and 170
civilians were murdered in a suicide assault on August 26. The United States
military spent a couple of months investigating and determined that the attack
was carried out by a single aircraft and was thus preventable. There was some
confusion at the scene since both the US army and the Taliban claimed that the
other had started the shooting. Shortly after, the United States retaliated,
and three days later, out of panic about a possible repeat of the carnage, it
mistakenly targeted a white vehicle with a drone attack, resulting in the
deaths of 10 people, including seven children.
Since many embassy guards were really
contractors, a number of nations refused to offer refuge to Afghans who had
worked for them. Unlike the guards at the US embassy, who were evacuated, the
125 guards at the UK embassy in Kabul were informed by phone on 19 August that
they no longer had employment and were not entitled for UK protection since
they were engaged via a contractor, GardaWorld. It was reported on June 16,
2022 that these guards were targeted by the Taliban for beatings alongside
Afghans who worked under the British Embassy. Pekka Haavisto, Finland's
minister of foreign affairs, said that the guards at the Finnish embassy were
"sub-contractors" and hence could not be put on evacuation lists.
Australia made a similar announcement about embassy guards, but reversed course
the next day to issue visas.
Airlifting individuals in danger under the
Taliban's authority was not a simple achievement, nor is it complete. Most
citizens fled Afghanistan in a hurry and did not carry or have the proper
papers, making the escape the first step in a long and arduous trip. Many
civilians have been sent to transit centres in countries like Italy, Germany,
and Qatar, where they will remain until they hear back from resettlement
organisations. Resettling a large number of refugees is a hard procedure, made
more so by the fact that many of these migrants attempt to enter the United
States without the proper permits.
What effects would the Taliban's rule over
Afghanistan's new government have on that country's ties to Pakistan?
For the first time in over two decades,
Pakistan has an ally in Kabul thanks to the Taliban's seizure of power.
However, Pakistan may soon discover that allying with the Taliban would be more
difficult than expected. Why? Because Islamabad may soon lose the leverage it
gained over its long-term asset as a result of its backing for the Taliban
during a conflict that has now ended. However, both parties are keen on keeping
things amicable and are taking steps toward a reset that may help it come out
on top and give Pakistan more power.
From the beginning, the Taliban have had
Pakistan's support. Supported the anti-Soviet mujahideen who became the
Taliban. In the 1990s, Islamabad was one of just three nations to formally
recognise the Taliban authority. After being overthrown by U.S. troops later
that year, Islamabad assisted in the group's reorganisation. Pakistan has given
sanctuary to Taliban commanders for almost two decades, as well as providing
medical care for its injured soldiers. The Taliban were able to keep fighting
despite losing thousands of men on the ground because to this aid.
Because of the Taliban's reliance on
Pakistan, Islamabad has been able to exert influence over the group's actions
on the battlefield and, more recently, to bring the Taliban to the negotiating
table with the U.S. However, with the Taliban now in complete control of
Afghanistan and declaring the war to be finished, such advantage is unlikely to
last. The Taliban leadership has no pressing need for Pakistani support now
that they have received a large military stockpile from the Afghan government
and leaving U.S. soldiers.
Islamabad, which desperately needs leverage,
has a difficult dilemma as a result. The Pakistanis have a simple but lofty
request for the new Taliban government: rein in the Pakistani Taliban
(Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP), who were once the country's greatest
terrorist danger but are now making a strong comeback. Afghanistan is home to
the group's top brass.
Between 2007 and 2014, the TTP conducted a
bloody campaign of violence in Pakistan, which was eventually reduced by
counterterrorism offensives launched by the Pakistani government. TTP strikes
in Pakistan have escalated in recent months, after a reconciliation effort led
by the group's new supreme commander. The Taliban in Pakistan (TTP) was inspired
by the Taliban's success in Afghanistan, as were other Islamist terrorist
groups in the area. It may be encouraged to increase its strikes in Pakistan.
TTP data shows that in August alone, it launched 32 strikes, the most it has
launched in a single month so far in 2018. Three Pakistani paramilitary
personnel were killed in an incident on September 5.
Keeping the TTP in check is a top priority
for Islamabad, therefore the Taliban's cooperation is welcome. However, the
Taliban are less likely to comply with Islamabad's demands now that they are no
longer dependent on Pakistan, even if the TTP has been a reliable, long-term
operational and ideological partner for the Taliban. Many future prominent TTP
leaders, including the group's initial supreme leader, Baitullah Mehsud, served
with the Taliban in Afghanistan prior to the group's 2007 inception. Since
then, TTP members have travelled from Pakistan to Afghanistan to participate in
Taliban-led strikes. Moreover, the two factions are united in their desire to
use violent means to create an emirate governed by strict interpretations of
sharia law (Islamic law). Since coming to power, Taliban propaganda towards the
TTP has been remarkably ambiguous. Spokesperson for the Taliban Zabihullah
Mujahid recently warned a Pakistani TV station that Afghanistan "would not
be exploited by anybody to disrupt the peace of another nation." On the
other hand, he said that it is Pakistan, not the Taliban, that must determine
"whether or not the TTP's fight is legal and to devise a strategy in
response." It seems the Taliban are unwilling to accept responsibility for
the situation.
Q.2 Examine
the development of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) during last three
years. How are international players influencing the progress of this project?
Progress made by the CPEC over the last
three years
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
has been in operation for about three years now. A critical mass of electric
power and infrastructural projects will be operational over the next 12 to 18
months, after which a number of further projects will come online. There has
never been a better time than now to evaluate Beijing and Islamabad's progress
on the huge, fifteen-year connectivity project, estimated at over $62 billion,
than halfway through the first of three five-year stages of CPEC.
The cost of the CPEC portfolio is mostly
attributable to electric power projects. There have been both huge achievements
and failures in the energy sector of the CPEC portfolio, which now consists of
17 projects worth approximately $20 billion. Pakistan will likely solve its
electric power gap by 2019, but the energy will be pricey compared to regional
rivals because of the country's fast chase of electricity.
Numerous power-related projects have been
finished ahead of time. The Sahiwal Coal Power Project, for example, required
multiple moving parts, including the building of coal jetties at Port Qasim,
the purchase of coal hopper cars to transport imported coal upland via
Pakistan's troubled, but improving, state-owned railway, and the building of
last-mile extensions of the main railway line.
The chief minister of Pakistan's Punjab
province, Shahbaz Sharif, had great hopes for the Sahiwal Coal Power Station,
and the speed of Chinese engineers, coupled with Sharif's high expectations,
allowed commercial operations to begin nearly a year sooner than is customary
for such projects. Floodlights were strung from cranes so work could continue
at night, The Economist said.
The Port Qasim coal power project's first
660W unit was also commissioned late last year, many months ahead of schedule.
Late in January of this year, a second 660MW unit was activated. Three CPEC
wind power plants in the province of Sindh are now operational as well. Two
massive lignite mining operations in the secluded Thar area of Sindh are moving
progress, each with accompanying mine mouth power stations. Other mining and
mine mouth power plant initiatives in Thar, such as a joint venture between
Yanzhou Coal and the UK-based Oracle Power PLC, have gained impetus thanks to
the success of these two projects.
There have also been notable setbacks in the
energy sector, most notably in the areas of project selection and commercial
terms negotiation. Pakistan's Gadani Coal Power Project, which comprised of 10
coal power plants with a combined installed generating capacity of 6600MW
shortly after the opening of CPEC, was an effort at going large soon met with
failure. Estimates put the cost of building the jetties for the project at $1
billion, but Pakistan was unable to drum up enough interest from investors to
make the venture viable. Nonetheless, Pakistan has showed resilience since
Gadani was scrapped, choosing instead for regasified liquefied natural gas
(RLNG) facilities outside the CPEC framework, which have come online in record
time.
Coal accounts for more over 70% of CPEC's
installed electric power output. Coal energy has been the backbone of the
economy, but efforts to supplement it with renewables have lagged. Zonergy
Energy, the Chinese company behind the Quaid-e Azam Solar Power Project, is
resisting a reduction in the prohibitively high upfront rate from 14.5
cents/kWh to a more manageable, but still high, 9.5 cents/kWh. The project has
been mired in litigation because Zonergy constructed just 300MW of the 900MW
capacity required by its contract with the Punjab provincial government.
To attract green field investments in regions
like Thar, Pakistan has inadequately negotiated upfront tariff rates and
provided extraordinarily high internal rates of return (IRRs) of 20 percent for
certain projects. At least $1.35 billion in tax breaks have been provided to
Chinese and Pakistani donors under CPEC. Initial tariff prices for CPEC power
projects are not much different from comparable projects in other countries,
even if they have lower IRRs than those in Thar. Occasionally they will even go
up a notch or two. This prompts the question, "What are the benefits of
CPEC to Pakistani electric power consumers?"
The levelized tariff for the 1320MW Port
Qasim Coal Power Project is $0.0836/kWh, which is higher than the levelized
tariffs for two other coal power projects in Bangladesh with Chinese sponsors,
the 1224MW Banshkahli Coal Power Project ($0.08259/kWh) and the 1320MW Payra
Coal Power Project ($0.083089/kWh). New energy in Pakistan would be more costly
due to CPEC security levies applied to consumer bills. Pakistan's central
government may need to sell bonds to cover the electric utility firms' arrears
from customers.
Pakistan's attempts at tariff rationalisation
will be hampered by the combination of high initial tariffs and surcharges,
which will also require the state to maintain or raise expensive subsidies and
make it harder for Pakistani textile exports to compete with those of Bangladesh
and Vietnam. Pakistan has somewhat high electric power costs, although these
may be mitigated by industry-led efforts to improve industrial logistics and
supply chains and by reducing transmission and distribution losses.
Early on, political rivalries and
inter-provincial disputes entered the CPEC debate as a result of mistakes made
by the Pakistani federal government and political rivalries between the
Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), which rules at the centre and in the
largest province, Punjab, and the Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaf (PTI), the second
largest party in the National Assembly and the leader of a coalition in the
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. A major source of tension was a debate over how
CPEC projects should be divided up. Politicians from Pakistan's less populous
provinces complained that the PML-home N's of Punjab received an unfairly large
share of government funding.
In December 2016, the top bilateral
decision-making body on CPEC, the Sino-Pak Joint Coordination Committee,
brought together all four provincial chief ministers of Pakistan, representing
the country's three main parties. This helped ease tensions between the
provinces. All provincial infrastructure projects were included to the CPEC
portfolio on a temporary basis during the meeting. However, there is still a
chance that smaller provinces would not obtain Chinese finance for their
projects. This is especially true for public transport projects in Peshawar and
Quetta, which need ongoing subsidies from the government. Those living on
Pakistan's outskirts would become disgruntled once more as a result.
Since this year's general elections will
usher in a period of political transformation, CPEC is also facing some degree
of unpredictability. Beijing has never previously committed its fate in
Pakistan to a single political party or a democratically elected civilian
administration. Given the continued tension between the civilian government and
the military in Pakistan, it will have to steer a course through the political
waters before and after the next general elections. Chinese leaders have been
active in forging connections with a wide variety of Pakistani political
players, despite their seeming preference for stability and the status quo. The
new Chinese ambassador recently addressed the Pakistani Parliamentary Committee
on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
Projects associated with CPEC will go more
slowly than planned due to the upcoming political shift. The most probable
result would be a decreased willingness on China's part to add more CPEC
projects. The strength of the CPEC agreement, however, will be tested during
the election and in the days after the vote. The PML-N is favoured to win
control of the federal government and the biggest province in Pakistan, but it is
possible that it may continue in power even with a reduced majority. PTI's
ascension to power as a coalition partner in the centre would be a
low-probability, high-impact scenario. Therefore, it is important to consider
how CPEC may function with a new party in power in Islamabad and the
Balochistan province, where Gwadar Port is situated. PTI has shown a distinct
approach to assistance, government, public expenditure, and even energy. For
instance, it supports renewable energy sources over fossil fuel power plants,
although it may adopt an energy strategy similar to the PML-N if it gains
central control.
How are different nations and organisations
impacting the development of this plan?
According to media reports, the head of the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Authority has accused the United States
of trying to derail the multibillion dollar project that is the economic
backbone of Pakistan. In 2015, during his visit to Pakistan, Chinese President
Xi Jinping officially inaugurated the ambitious CPEC. Through a system of
roads, railroads, and other infrastructure and economic projects, it seeks to
link western China with the Gwadar seaport in southern Pakistan.
One thing is abundantly evident from the
perspective of the developing geo-strategic situation: the United States,
backed by India, is antagonistic to CPEC. Nothing can stop it from failing.
During his speech at the CPEC Summit held at the Institute of Business
Administration in Karachi on Saturday, Khalid Mansoor, the Special Assistant to
Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan on CPEC concerns, emphasised the need to
take a stance on this issue. With 71 CPEC projects totaling USD 27.3 billion
now under progress, Islamabad is the sixth biggest beneficiary of Chinese
foreign development finance.
According to an article in the Dawn
newspaper, several Western research tanks and pundits have labelled the CPEC an
economic trap that has already resulted in inflated public debt levels and
disproportionately strong Chinese influence in Pakistan's economy. According to
a statement made by the premier's adviser, the United States and India are
still trying to talk Pakistan out of participating in China's Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), a global infrastructure development plan in which China has
been spending extensively in around 70 nations.
Pakistan will certainly not forego any of the
advantages it offers. He went on to say that Western efforts to weaken China's
strategic dominance in the area will fail since the West has already
"burned its fingers" in the alliance on several occasions. In
Mansoor's opinion, the CPEC represents China's political aspirations to the
Western nations. U.S. and European officials regard CPEC with scepticism
because they believe it is part of China's strategy to increase its political,
geopolitical, and economic might in the region, but China has been able to
relieve most of this concern, as Mansoor pointed out.
He concluded that the United States is
weighing the potential political and economic costs of leaving the area. I had
a lengthy conversation with the embassy staff in the United States. I let them
know that they may use CPEC too. According to him, they have also indicated a
desire to become more involved, saying they can see how it would be good for
both nations. According to Mansoor, the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan
has been approached about joining the CPEC, which would be a boon for both
countries. According to him, there is much enthusiasm for establishing trade
links between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as with other nearby nations
like Iran. A few nations in Europe have shown signs of interest (in CPEC). He
stated they kept sending ambassadors. In discussing the credibility of CPEC and
the momentum of its development, he brought out the prevalence of disinformation
and bad propaganda. Phase II of CPEC will be far more extensive than the first
phase.
Q.3 Explain
the root-causes of US withdrawal from Afghanistan after a long stay of almost
two decades. How international media have responded in this regard? Support
your answer with examples from international media.
Why the United States left Afghanistan
after almost twenty years
The United States will be judged by history
not for leaving Afghanistan, but rather for the disastrous way in which it
left, was communicated, and was planned not once, but twice. The United States
government blundered horribly by failing to adequately plan for the time it
would take to evacuate the area and by failing to increase security at the
airport by increasing the size of its surrounding fence. As a consequence of
these and other errors in judgement, American servicemen were killed, Taliban
checkpoints were established, American citizens were trapped in Kabul and
elsewhere in Afghanistan, and a humanitarian crisis unfolded outside Kabul's
Hamid Karzai International Airport.
Due to the US departure, Afghanistan has
fallen into the hands of terrorists and violent Islamist radicals, making the
country even more dangerous than it was before. The possibility of seeming to
have abandoned American troops in Afghanistan exacerbates this danger. Every
U.S. citizen, permanent resident, and special immigrant visa (SIV) applicant
who wishes to leave Afghanistan must be allowed to do so, as promised by the
United States. There will be no success in our quest until that time has come.
The greatest non-Kabul cohorts of American
citizens, lawful permanent residents, and SIV candidates may be found in Herat,
Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Jalalabad. Even if they really want to travel to
the United States, the United States must not ignore the other large cities
where security concerns have caused residents to stay inside.
The Taliban may be able to track down SIV
candidates and other Afghan friends who helped the United States and NATO by
exploiting biometric technology abandoned by the US military and databases
maintained by the Afghan government. Uzbekistan should brace itself for a wave
of Afghan migrants, and some of them have already started heading north.
Afghans evacuating north should be assisted by non-governmental organisations,
the United States, and European allies by using commercially available imagery
to map out escape routes away from areas with a high concentration of Taliban
fighters, learn how to navigate those routes, and prepare for unforeseen
obstacles like weather. The United States should designate safe zones in
Afghanistan with the Group of Seven (G7) and other UN members. The
international community might take on a "blue helmet" role in
Afghanistan.
What kind of reaction have foreign media
outlets had to this story?
Nearly twenty years after the United States
initially invaded Afghanistan, on Monday just before midnight local time, the
last US soldiers left the nation, handing over power to the Taliban ahead of US
President Joe Biden's August 31 deadline. The future of Afghanistan: what
should we expect? If American troops are no longer in charge of Kabul
International Airport, how will evacuations take place? What should we do next
in our counterterrorism efforts? When the United States withdraws, how will
other regional and global forces influence the nation it leaves behind?
We polled members of the Atlantic Council,
many of whom have been involved in Afghanistan policy at the highest levels of
government, for their comments and suggestions for the way forward. As
additional analysis of the withdrawal and its effects from experts becomes
available, this article will be updated accordingly.
The United States has finished pulling out,
but our interests and, by extension, our missions, remain. Since Osama bin
Laden relocated there from Sudan in 1996, preventing Afghanistan from serving
as a safe haven for terrorists planning attacks against the United States has
been a top priority for the United States. As unfortunate as it may be, the
Taliban's resurgence has made it much more difficult to maintain such support.
It is a competition today to determine who can establish a successful
over-the-horizon counterterrorism programme faster than the Salafi Jihadist
factions there can secure a safe haven from which to plot attacks on the
outside world. I have no idea how long it will be until the outcome of this
contest is known, but I believe we will have a good idea by the time President
Biden's first term concludes.
Other, less crucial interests of ours exist
in that region as well. The well-being of the allegedly hundreds of remaining
American citizens is a key priority. Many of them stayed, but they are now
prime candidates for abduction; they might join Mark Frerichs as hostages held
by the Taliban or allied groups as bargaining chips in upcoming talks. Second
in importance is continuing to support the tens of thousands of our former
Afghan comrades. Some of them have already gone into hiding and, despite the
distrust they no doubt feel from our abandonment, may eventually form the core
of an irregular proxy force that will assist our over-the-horizon
counterterrorism campaign. Many of these people wanted to leave but were
stopped by the Taliban. The protection of the hundreds of thousands of Afghans
who have a reasonable fear of persecution at the hands of the Taliban and who
would be eligible for refuge if they ever reached our shores comes in a distant
second. To get out of Afghanistan, the same smugglers who earned a fortune
twenty years ago when people and supplies were being smuggled in would now want
enormous sums of money.
And below that, a more general humanitarian
concern for the Afghan people, whose economy and governance have been
artificially propped up for years by foreign funding, and which are about to
collapse more rapidly than they likely currently appreciate, even before the
inevitable wave of US and international sanctions is imposed and enforced in
response to Taliban atrocities. Afghanistan is likely to remain in a state of
low-level civil conflict for some years, until the Taliban eventually comes to
the same conclusion that we reached about a decade ago: that no one institution
can successfully manage the whole of Afghanistan as a centralised state. Only a
system born out of ongoing talks, deals, and renegotiations between the central
government and regional or local powers has any chance of lasting.
A new chapter of U.S. military involvement in
Afghanistan will begin even as the United States formally ends its combat operations
there. The safe evacuation of American people and coalition and Afghan friends,
as well as the prevention of future terrorist assaults by al-Qaeda and others,
remain critical U.S. objectives. It will take a lot more effort (diplomatic and
military), time, and national resources to achieve these goals and others. With
the poorly managed retreat, the United States has a lot of work to do to
strengthen its partnerships. Likewise, this will need fresh initiatives if the
United States is to successfully traverse this perilous new period while
preserving national security and economic prosperity.
The American people have every right to
demand answers to their questions about what went wrong with US strategy in
Afghanistan now that the military pullout is complete. Also, they should be
given forthright responses, even if doing so makes those in charge of
policymaking feel uneasy. Civilian leaders and US government officials' claims
of imminent victory should be the starting point of a full investigation, as should
their disregard for (and sometimes suppression of) facts that should have
prompted a reevaluation of US goals. The courageous men and women of the United
States Armed Forces put forth extraordinary effort and suffered unimaginable
difficulties for over twenty years on a mission that many people at the time
believed was not critical to American national security. The truth of these
fears has been cruelly revealed. We owe it to them and the generations to come
to figure out what went wrong and make it a national priority to prevent such
catastrophes from happening again.
Q.4 How
media can play its role in highlighting soft image of Pakistan across the
globe? Strengthen your answer with sound arguments.
Pakistan's state-run media has been in the
forefront of promoting the country's positive image as a peaceful, democratic,
and moderate Islamic state in response to the widespread unfavourable portrayal
of the country in the media. Radio Pakistan, Pakistan Television, and the
Associated Press of Pakistan, the three official media outlets, often include
segments discussing the country's recent economic and security triumphs.
On Sunday, Pir Muhammad Aslam Bodla, chairman
of the National Assembly Standing Committee on Information, Broadcasting, and
National Heritage, told APP that the state media has been doing a great job of
maintaining a favourable and hospitable image for the nation. He said that PTV,
PBC, and APP, all of which are state-run, should be commended for carrying out
their duties as patriotic citizens. He lamented that a minority of Pakistan's
private media outlets had been emphasising the country's problems. As a
watchdog in a democracy, the media is doing its job, but it also has a
responsibility to promote a good and accurate portrayal of Pakistan.
According to Director of News at PBC Rao
Sadiq Ali, a country's image in the contemporary world is crucial, and the
state media is leading the charge to promote a positive one by showcasing
Pakistan's many beautiful natural landmarks and illustrious cultural
traditions. The process of constructing a positive public perception cannot be
rushed. It must be an ongoing expectation over a significant time frame. The
media must play a part in presenting Pakistan in a favourable light. The media
has to be enlisted to help make Pakistan a better, more optimistic place, and
its influence should be used wisely.
State-run television, according to PTV's
Director of News Awais Butt, has been doing its part to promote a favourable
picture of the nation, which has been under attack from dissidents. According
to him, PTV's coverage of the surge in domestic tourism this year is evidence
that people feel more at ease in their own country. He further said that the
people of Pakistan had enthusiastically celebrated Independence Day and had
welcomed the Azadi train wherever it had stopped across the nation. PTV has
aired all these events, which show that people are less afraid to go out and
enjoy the celebrations now that they are safe.
The APP, like Radio Pakistan and PTV, sees it
as its patriotic duty to dispel the false and harsh stereotypes about Pakistan
and promote a positive picture of the country. The successes of Operation
Zarb-e-Azb, the recovery of the economy, and the progress made on
infrastructure projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor have been
featured prominently in APP's Urdu, English, Arabic, Video News Service,
regional services, and photo news service. Furthermore, it has been showcasing
the county's many ancient sites and scenic tourism hotspots. The official media
has been the voice for highlighting the country's peace credentials, including
its desire to establish amicable ties with other nations, particularly
neighbouring countries, and protecting the national interest by dispelling
misunderstandings about the globe.
The successes of the country's athletes and
designers in the realms of entertainment and fashion have also been promoted by
state media in an effort to present a more hospitable face to the outside
community. To counteract the impression frequently presented in the western
media that the democracy is still fragile in the nation, state media
institutions have been promoting the successes of the country in maintaining a
stable democratic and political process in their programming and news coverage.
Under Prime Minister Imran Khan, Pakistan's
foreign policy has become more assertive as the country has begun to actively
react to global developments. Previously silent on global concerns like climate
change and Islamophobia, Pakistan has recently grown more outspoken on the
diplomatic front. Pakistan's robust reaction to the most recent crisis in
Palestine is part of a broader diplomatic trend aimed at increasing the
country's soft power. Tourism, along with diplomacy, has been seen as a key
component in improving Pakistan's international reputation. Pakistan's
investments in the tourism industry, such as the construction of the Kartarpur
Corridor and the tourism channel Discover Pakistan, as well as the official
backing and widespread promotion of the inaugurations of tourist projects, are
a direct complement to Pakistan's soft power goal.
Despite the fact that diplomacy and tourism
have played important roles in bolstering Pakistan's reputation as a stable and
developing nation, the positive effects of this use of soft power are fleeting
at best. To begin with, diplomacy may cause long-term inconsistency in position
because it promotes reconciliation between players with divergent moral and
intellectual perspectives. To the contrary, this may have a negative impact on
a country's ability to influence others peacefully. U.S. soft power has been
weakened, for instance, by the country's hypocritical advocacy for democracy at
home while financially supporting Middle Eastern tyrants abroad. Second, as a
result of globalisation, travellers are increasingly going to many different
nations in one trip. Pakistan is not expected to develop a soft power edge over
other South Asian nations with comparable geographical and cultural settings if
this trend continues.
Diplomacy for Pakistan's prior international
isolation and tourism to repair its tarnished security image are examples of
how soft power may be used for damage control, and both are now being used by
Pakistan. Pakistan has to rethink its approach to soft power and invest in
industries like media, education, and trade if it wants to take a more
prominent position on the international scene.
The media plays a crucial role in the arsenal
of soft power that every state might use. The BBC, CNN, and TRT all have
international audiences that they use to promote the political and cultural
norms of their home countries. Hollywood has been instrumental in boosting
patriotism and American values via the entertainment industry. Translation and
distribution of Turkish plays like Dirilis Ertugrul have lately been tried as a
means of exporting Turkish culture. PTV World, PTV's foreign English-language
subsidiary, might expand Pakistan's influence abroad if its marketing approach
were revamped.
Pakistan has a thriving media industry, but
its channels do not reach an international audience, limiting the country's
capacity to spread its ideas abroad. Its publishing and broadcast outlets
mostly address domestic audiences with content. Although Pakistan's
entertainment sector is thriving, it seldom produces work that is marketable
outside. The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) branch of the Pakistan
Armed Forces prioritises domestic rather than international PR in even its most
expensive undertakings.
Media in Pakistan is a powerful tool for
increasing the country's influence in diplomatic circles. In this regard,
Pakistan's state-run television network, Pakistan Television (PTV), might be
useful. Despite technical and financial shortcomings, the station has seen renewed
interest thanks to the airing of Dirilis Ertugrul. The government should
capitalise on this short-term uptick by funding entertainment productions that
highlight Pakistan's cultural environment, translating and dubbing them into
other languages, and releasing them through internet streaming services like
Netflix. PTV World, PTV's foreign English-language subsidiary, might expand
Pakistan's influence abroad if its marketing approach were revamped. Its
present social media presence is mostly promotional of its television news
shows, but it has the potential to be transformed into an information hub by
providing more in-depth coverage of local and international news. With updated
web visuals and frequent digestible news video posts, PTV World may attract a worldwide
audience in the digital realm.
Q.5 How
do you see the current state of relations between US and Pakistan? Write a
critical analysis in the historical context of Pak-US relations.
After Pakistan
gained its independence in 1947, the United States formally recognised it and
began establishing diplomatic ties. Our cooperation with Pakistan spans several
areas, including stabilising operations in Afghanistan, the fight against
terrorism, energy, commerce, and investment. In line with its National Action
Plan against terrorism and Prime Minister Imran Khan's public declarations,
Pakistan has taken action against externally oriented militant groups and
UN-designated terrorist organisations operating from its territory. The United
States is committed to pressuring Pakistan to take immediate and permanent
action against these organisations. U.S. national security interests do allow
for certain limited exceptions to the January 2018 suspension of security aid
to Pakistan. Historically, the United States has been a major destination for
FDI into Pakistan, and it continues to be the country's biggest export market.
U.S. government financing for business conferences, technical aid, and outreach
programmes, as well as reverse trade delegations, contribute to the growth of
commerce between the two countries.
Pakistan, which
has the world's fifth-largest population, is predicted to have the world's
42nd-largest economy in 2020 by the International Monetary Fund. Pakistan's top
export market is the United States, whereas China is the country's top supplier
of imports. Major U.S. investments in Pakistan during the last two decades have
been focused on consumer products, chemicals, energy, agriculture, business
process out-sourcing, transportation, and communications, making the United
States one of the top investors in Pakistan. Senior officials from the United
States Department of Commerce and the United States International Development
Finance Corporation (DFC) have met with their Pakistani counterparts in an
effort to strengthen business connections between the two countries. However,
legislative obstacles, insufficient intellectual property protections, and
unfair taxes have all hindered U.S. corporations' activities in Pakistan.
Pakistan improved its position on the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business index
by 28 places in the most recent assessment, moving up to 108th place. The
United States and Pakistan are still working together to improve the economic
environment there.
The goal of the
United States' civilian aid programme is to work with Pakistan to help it
achieve greater safety, stability, prosperity, and independence. U.S. aid has
been coordinated across agencies and has focused on projects that promote
economic growth and bilateral trade; the rule of law in the newly merged
districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; refugees and refugee-hosting communities; law
enforcement; civil society; people-to-people exchanges; and the prevention and
control of communicable diseases like COVID-19 and polio.
The US exit
from Afghanistan in August 2021 has once again highlighted the precarious
nature of ties between Pakistan and the US. Concerns in the United States
concerning the nature of its connections with Islamabad have been developing in
light of Pakistan's reportedly expanding and questionable role in its
commitment to the War on Terror. While some US officials believe Pakistan still
has a role to play and that continued interaction with the nation is necessary,
others have called for a review of the US's conditions of engagement with
Islamabad. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken was asked by lawmakers if it
was time for Washington to reassess its relationship with Pakistan, and he had
to reassure them that "this is one of the things we are going to be
looking at in the days, and weeks ahead - the role that Pakistan has played
over the last 20 years but also the role we would want to see it play in the
coming years and what it will take for it to do that."
At a time when
Pakistan is pressing the international world and the United States in
particular to recognise Pakistan's participation and "sacrifices" in
the battle against terrorism, Secretary Blinken delivered the statement.
Pakistan has been insisting that Washington treat it the same as any other ally
and sovereign nation, rather than just bringing it along for ad hoc fights
against dangers and terrorists. In an interview given in June of 2021,
Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan described ties with the United States as
"lopsided" and said that Washington "thought that they were
delivering help to Pakistan, and thus Pakistan felt obligated to do US'
bidding." In a May 2021 meeting with his American counterpart, Pakistani
Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi had expressed his country's desire for
improved ties based on "close economic cooperation, stronger regional
connectivity, and shared vision for a peaceful South Asia." Given
Islamabad's new strategy, in which its leaders demand that the United States
regard Pakistan as an equal partner, the Pakistani government, civil society,
and political analysts were forced to respond angrily to the US secretary of
state's comments. Blinken's comments were therefore "not in keeping with
the close collaboration" between the United States and Pakistan, as stated
by the Pakistani administration.
The history of
relations between the two nations is marked by ups and downs. As early as the
1950s, these connections were created on a purely transactional basis, with
Pakistan promising the United States protection in return for financial aid. When
security concerns are no longer an issue, the two parties' relationship reverts
to one in which they have few if any shared interests that would require them
to work together.
Since their
respective foundings, the United States and Pakistan have seldom had common
interests. Even the same events might be seen in very different ways by each of
them. Although Pakistan insists that it was never a voluntary part of the
U.S.-led coalition against the Taliban in Afghanistan, it is a truth that it
has become a key partner in the War on Terror. Pakistan decided to join the war
because of the United States' coercive diplomacy and Islamabad's fears that, if
it rejected, the United States would support India's participation and enhance
India's position in Afghanistan, undercutting Pakistan's concerns.
Pakistan has
devised a plan to profit from its collaboration with the US in light of the
need of doing so for the country's security. Most of the negotiations and
agreements pertaining to this collaboration were security-related, placing GHQ
in charge rather than Pakistan's civilian government because of this. C.
Christian Fair, rather irritably a few years ago, observed, "Pakistan has
been highly solicitous, in an endeavour to commercialise its different sources of
significance." Pakistan was able to put this theory into effect by gaining
access to these funds. But Pakistan has been saying it never got any credit for
its contribution in the War on Terror and that the consequences of its
involvement were enormous and irreversible. Consequently, Washington and
Islamabad have opposing stories to tell about the situation.
President
Donald J. Trump criticised Pakistan, saying, "we have been paying Pakistan
billions and billions of dollars at the same time they are housing the very
terrorists that we are fighting," in an apparent attempt to vent his
frustration over the intractable nature of the Afghan mess and his inability to
determine when to withdraw American forces from the country. The Pakistani
foreign minister responded by reminding Trump that his country does not get
"billions of dollars" from the US. Washington's financial assistance
to Islamabad was, in reality, compensation for Pakistan's assistance to the
United States and its allies in Afghanistan.
When it comes
to undermining the efforts of the US-led coalition and the Afghan republic,
Washington is not alone in accusing Pakistan of providing safe haven to the
Taliban and other terrorist groups. Afghanistan's government has often accused
Pakistan of working with the Taliban to sabotage efforts to defeat them in
battle. Director of Afghanistan's Government Media and Information Center Dawa
Khan Menapal told Voice of America (VOA) in May 2021, "we all think that
the terrorists have bases and support in Pakistan," quoting then-President
Ashraf Ghani.
Despite
"some action against externally-focused extremist groups and UN-designated
terrorist organisations operating from its territory," the United States
insists that Pakistan "take decisive and irreversible action against these
groups." Due to its ongoing efforts to combat the Taliban and, more
recently, other terrorist organisations in Afghanistan and the
"Af-Pak" area, Washington has stated this remark on several
occasions. Pakistan has claimed they have done more than anybody else could,
but their efforts have not been recognised by the United States. Pakistani
Prime Minister Imran Khan questioned in the National Assembly, "When we
rendered so many services, did they [the United States] applaud us or recognise
our sacrifices?" In addition, he emphasised the "idiocy" of
becoming involved in someone else's fight. However, Khan has not yet issued a
statement explicitly rejecting Islamabad's backing or severing relations with
the United States. It seems that the prime minister's goal is not to sever all
connections with Washington, but rather to renegotiate the conditions of
engagement.
If it is
assumed that Pakistan's claims about the human and financial costs of
Islamabad's choice to join the War on Terror are accurate, then it is puzzling
that Pakistan has repeatedly complained about the delay or cessation of
Coalition Support Funds (CSF) payments. Why did Pakistan restart its support
for the US and its allies after temporarily withdrawing it after the Salala
incident in November 2011? Pakistan's major priority seems to have been
securing financial aid from the United States while capitalising on other
negative developments in its bilateral relationship with the United States'
capital. Money from the US has never been denied. Pakistan has skillfully
handled the nearly $8 billion in U.S. assistance without jeopardising its
strategic goals, which include containing the resurgence of the Taliban.
Furthermore, several regions of Pakistan, like Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, have not
benefited from the aid.
The Pakistani
military has found the money from Washington to be valuable in updating and
acquiring new military weaponry, which is one reason why the country has not
severed relations with the United States and pulled out of the War on Terror.
Given the dismal state of the country's economy, doing the same would have been
challenging. According to Akbar Zaidi, the military in Pakistan has gotten a
lot of U.S. funding, which has helped solidify the military's grip over the
country's political and economic systems. The army's use of visuals to
emphasise their sacrifices in the war on terrorism has also helped boost the
force's credibility at home.
The United
States and Pakistan have a "lopsided" relationship since they have
few common strategic or economic objectives. Security concerns were the impetus
for the partnership, and both nations needed each other. For Pakistan, these
seemingly undesirable conditions presented a chance to make its importance
known and to monetize them; for Washington, Pakistan was necessary to secure
its defence against the Soviets in the 1980s and to eliminate Osama bin
Laden/al-Qaeda in the 2000s. Artfully, it has strengthened the Taliban and the
Haqqani Network and expanded their strongholds within Pakistan, raising
security worries in Washington. The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other
terror groups have been exploiting these same regions as safe havens and
staging grounds for attacks against Pakistan, therefore this approach has had
devastating consequences for the country as well. So, the aim of the barrier
along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border that will be finished in June 2021 but
will only be effective with targeted deployment. It would be very difficult to
tell the difference between Afghan and Pakistani Taliban if they were to cross
the border.
It is worth
noting that Pakistan's civilian government and the military may have some
subtle disagreements on this matter. The game's potential economic and human
consequences may alarm civilian authorities, but the military's strategic goals
may not give them much reason for concern.
The United
States is stuck in the middle of the complicated calculations made by the
Pakistani military to protect its interests in Afghanistan. It was never going
to be simple for the United States to completely leave or fully embrace
Pakistan and its policies in the area, given the extensive engagement of
Islamabad/GHQ in Afghanistan.